The Historical Roots of the

'Awkward Partner' Narrative
Academic, political and even popular perceptions of Britain's four and half decades as an EC/EU member are dominated by what is frequently referred to as the 'awkward partner' narrative. This emphasizes the multiple clashes between the UK and its continental partners, the doubts about 'Europe' in British domestic discourse, and, sometimes the misgivings and annoyance about perfidious Albion felt amongst the other member states. Britain has thus seen itself -and has been seen by others -as a reluctant European, unsure in its commitment to the cause, and hence prone to squabble and fight with its fellow Community/Union members.
A detailed look at Britain's track record as an EC/EU member state suggests however that reality has been rather more complex. The UK certainly has had its fair share of disagreements and rows with its European partners. The squabbles and crises highlighted by the awkward partner tale are real enough. But they have always been flanked by a much more constructive pattern of engagement -one where British governments, British officials, and British political parties have been able to exercise significant influence over the course of the integration process.
Such active participation has helped promote policies that the UK favourednotably the establishment of the Single Market and successive rounds of Community/EU enlargement -, has enabled many British officials in Brussels to gain strong and largely positive reputations, and has made the UK viewpoint an important factor in explaining what has and hasn't happened in the Community/Union ever since 1973. The UK in other words has been an active -and successful -partner, as well as an awkward one.
There are many ways of explaining why this more positive tale of British participation has been so systematically overshadowed by the standard awkward partner narrative. Some would highlight the different political and bureaucratic levels at which the constructive and combative engagement has taken place; a lot of the positive contribution has been made at meetings that the media seldom cover or notice, whereas many of the rows have occurred at the highly mediatised European summits. Margaret Thatcher's strident disagreements with Jacques Delors or Helmut Kohl or David Cameron's attempt to veto the Eurozone's first institutional response to the Euro crisis have always loomed much larger in journalistic coverage of the European integration process than the constructive dayto-day contributions of less senior ministers or officials. Also important has been the UK's decision both early on in its EEC membership and more recently to confront head-on certain central policy priorities desired by its partners that it was never likely to be able to alter. This occurred in the 1970s and early 1980s with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and then again in the 1990s with Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The highly predictable failure of such Quixotic attempts then all but eclipsed successful British influence over other, lower-profile, policy areas.
Still more significant, however, has been a strong tendency amongst the British political elite, the British press, and even the British public seemingly to prefer accounts which emphasised the confrontational aspects of British European policy and downplayed the country's positive contributions. This lopsided reading appeared very early in Britain's European experience, and persisted until the messy end. And this is where the longer-term history of relations between Britain and its geographical neighbours comes in. Because in explaining why so many in the UK seem to have instinctively interpreted their country's relationship with its ostensible partners through an adversarial viewpoint, historical tropes about the country's splendid isolation, brave resistance to continental tyranny, and preference for empire or the US rather than its continental neighbours would appear to have played an important role.
References back to Britain's nineteenth century history matter in this context largely because of their seeming implication that the country's apogee of power and prestige coincided with a period of detachment (or ostensible detachment at least) from the rest of Europe. Few politicians, journalists or citizens know much about the foreign policy of Lord Salisbury. But a vague notion of Pax Britannica, plus the resonant sound of the 'splendid isolation' formula itself, has helped to sustain the idea that active engagement with its neighbours of the type that has characterised British policy since 1973 (if not much earlier) is a sign of how much the country's prestige, position and sense of self-worth has declined from the heyday of Empire. Becoming European seemed as one former Commissioner put it to me nearly 30 years ago an option resorted to 'faute de mieux'. This contrasted strongly with the experience of many other EU member states for whom joining 'Europe' was a step away from inglorious isolation, and a way of re-engaging with those moments of national history when Spain, Poland, Hungary, or Austria had been European powers to be reckoned with. The UK's own 'return to Europe', in other words, was a recognition of weakness, a gesture of resignation, rather than a welcome escape from enforced marginalization. In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that for many the reality of this enforced participation, this loveless marriage, has been the litany of squabbles and disappointments that make up the awkward partner narrative. None of these views, of course, suffice in isolation to explain either the outcome of the 2016 referendum or the discomforts of Britain's experience within the EC/EU. But realising how historically rooted has been the adversarial mode of thought that many in Britain have used to analyse the integration process, does help explain why UK politicians, journalists and public alike have been more interested in confrontation rather than cooperation in Brussels. The awkward partner narrative is not a fiction, but it isn't a wholly representative view either. It does however fit well with how many in this country have chosen to see our European ties, whether prior to EC membership, during our forty plus years within the EC/EU, or, no doubt, in the troubled years that lie ahead.
